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ABSTRACT
Warwood, James, M.A., Spring 2016

English Literature

What Do You Think I Am?: On Perceiving Unintelligibility in the Nonbinary Gender
Experience
Chairperson: Dr. Casey Charles
What does it mean to be “retired from gender,” and what role does such an identity play
in daily life? Engaging with the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Judith Butler, this
project attempts to elucidate the experience of nonbinary – that is, external to the
male/female gender binary – gendered individuals, and the ultimate unintelligibility of
that experience. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach to perception allows for an
exploration of the social norms and regulations that determine how gender is defined in
Western culture; combined with Butler’s significant work on gender and its
performativity, phenomenology proves a useful tool for revealing the constructedness of
gender. Although an arbitrary system, the gender binary serves as a mechanism of socalled social truth: because the nonbinary reality rejects this truth the nonbinary gender
performance not only appears unintelligible to the binary other but also represents a
threat to social stability. This paper uses the memoirs in Gender Failure – written by two
self-identified nonbinary individuals – to consider how social norms inform binary
perception and how that perception constitutes the nonbinary self. Perceived from within
the binary matrix, the nonbinary self appears unintelligible: as a result, the validity of
their gendered reality is threatened. Conscious of the conceptual gap between nonbinary
and binary individuals, this project explores gender as the subject of the perceptive act
and not only outlines the delegitimization of the nonbinary reality but also suggests
opportunities to make space for non-normative gendered experiences.
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Introduction
It's almost akin to the Sisyphus myth – the toiling journey of gender
transition and pushing the boulder higher up the hill, and as soon as the
perceived summit of inhabiting the other gender is reached, the stone rolls
down the other side as I realize this gender doesn't provide any lasting
reflection of my inner self either. So, it must ascend again, over and over,
each day, as the most fitting expression continually changes.
– Drew Cordes
Articulating your personal identity may be as simple as filling out the “About
Me” section of a dating site profile. Information such as physical appearance, hobbies,
likes and dislikes is presented with the assumption that the reader will be able to
assemble a coherent and accurate image of who you are as an individual. However, the
other person cannot form a unified whole based solely on the information you provide:
instead, this information acts as superficial additions to a basic – and normative – social
object. In other words, the reader of your “About Me” presumes that underneath these
unique qualities is an individual who complies with imposed social norms.
The project of this paper is to define such an interpretive act when the perceived
object does not adhere to a socially sanctioned and normative template. The constrictive
nature of this template of course means that few people actually fit; in fact the template
itself seems to be the exception to the reality of human experience. Gender, a stringently
regulated identity category, stifles this reality to the extent that deviations from the norm
become unintelligible modes of identity. I focus on nonbinary gender identities – those
that break from the gender binary altogether – as the ultimate deviation. As a perceived
object that rejects the normative template, the nonbinary individual cannot be perceived
as coherent without first explicitly defining the reality of the foundational nonbinary self.

Because the nonbinary self does not fit the regulated gender template, the binary
other cannot empathetically conceive the reality of that self. In other words, this
disconnected understanding of gender means that the binary other cannot truly
understand the nonbinary experience. According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
interpersonal empathy requires common ground, or the potential for shared experiences.
Without this empathy, the other cannot accurately perceive the reality of the self.
Certainly this conceptual distance exists between all individuals as nothing can be
identically experienced by more than one person; however, the oppositional nature of the
nonbinary self’s relationship to the dominant social structure creates a disconnect so
fundamental that it can only be cognitively understood by the binary other – in other
words, true empathy is impossible, meaning that the viability of nonbinary personhood is
threatened.
The work of Gayle Salamon in Assuming A Body: Transgender and Rhetorics of
Materiality provides a useful starting point for the project of this paper. She draws on the
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and the psychoanalysis of Freud for a consideration of
transgender embodiment and personhood. For Salamon, the transgender body takes shape
in the intersubjective relationship between self and other. However, where she sees
bodily constitution in this contact, she does so on the assumption that the body that is
perceived is legible for the binary. I take up Salamon’s arguments and extend them to
where the perceived gendered body cannot be recognized: what happens to embodiment
and personhood when intersubjective relationships cannot construct a coherent self?
Throughout this paper I will also engage primarily with Merleau-Ponty as well as
Judith Butler. I find Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological interest in intersubjective and
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indeterminate perception makes for a productive consideration of nonbinary specifically
and gender more generally; a phenomenology of perception breaks apart the perceptive
act, seeking out the elements that determine why we know what we do. Investigating the
external influences that inform binary perception and challenge nonbinary presentation, I
suggest the sources of the incommensurability between these two gender categories. In
combination with Butler – particularly her work on the origins and performativity of
gender – the phenomenology of perception produces the foundation for Chapter One,
which lays out my understanding of the nonbinary existence at its points of contact with
the gender binary.
My purpose here is not to say that binary individuals simply cannot understand
the nonbinary existence and therefore should not even try; on the contrary, my hope is
that an understanding of the regulatory nature of the gender binary, and the ways that it
influences the perception of gendered bodies will allow for a consciousness of the
compulsory gendering practices in Western societies. While I contend that the empathetic
gap between nonbinary and binary individuals can never be completely closed, I do think
that an awareness of gender as it is presented here will make it possible to make space for
the nonbinary gender experience in the binary imaginary.

I. Merleau-Ponty and His Phenomenology
Merleau-Ponty opens Phenomenology of Perception by acknowledging that no
sufficient definition of phenomenology exists due to its paradoxical nature.
Phenomenology claims to study essences abstracted from existence, while also returning
essences to existence in order to better understand the world. Phenomenology places in
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abeyance the assumptions of the natural attitude – the set of uncritically adopted beliefs
about the world – understanding that this attitude presupposes that all meaning is
available at the surface; at the same time it is a philosophy that must retain such naïveté
in order to achieve a “direct and primitive contact with the world.” It calls itself a
rigorous science but tries to describe our experience “as it is” without considering
physiological origin or causal explanations provided by scientists, historians, or
sociologists (vii). Given these conflicting interpretations of phenomenology, one may
wonder whether it is a philosophy with any utility.
Literally, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: our perception of things;
things as we perceive them in our experiences; and our experience of things and of our
perception of things (Smith). More specifically, phenomenology studies consciousness as
constructed by our experiences of the world. This investigative project aims to reveal the
process of acquiring and attributing the meanings that represent objects, and how those
meanings inform our experiences and thus our consciousness. Phenomenologists consider
experience as primarily structured by intentionality. Merleau-Ponty defines intentionality
as the recognition of “consciousness itself as a project of the world, meant for a world
which it neither embraces nor possesses, but toward which it is perpetually directed”
(xvii). Intentionality, then, is simply the direction of experiences of consciousness toward
the world. Individuals experience the world only through this perpetual direction:
classical Husserlian phenomenology states that certain conditions such as embodiment,
cultural context, language, or social background enable and shape such direction
(Smith).1 These conditions make up and inform the acquired meanings of things in a
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given experience. Thus the world only becomes a meaningful object as determined by the
nature of the intentionality in the moment of experience.
Taking in the intention – “the unique mode of existence” – expressed in the
experience of things allows the phenomenologist to begin to expose the origins of things
(Merleau-Ponty xviii). A study of origins must be rooted in the description of “things
themselves,” refusing to judge the world by means not based in my own point of view.
Explanations of the world not derived from my experience can be nothing for me but
hypothetical. By transcending the hypothetical through experiential description, the
phenomenologist can grasp the “real” thing rather than an ideal instituted by an external
rationale (viii). Such idealism does not allow for the transience and complexity of reality;
rather than perceive the world according to a single, stable notion, the phenomenologist
must continuously dismantle their perception in search of further and more complex
meanings. Phenomenological analysis takes nothing for granted, and is a perpetual
beginning based on an enduring “’wonder’ in the face of the world;” such wonder persists
even after a meaning or origin appears to have been revealed. Phenomenological analysis
founds a transcendental consciousness of the world that demonstrates the strange and
paradoxical nature of reality (xiii).2
Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysical project is not to abstract out the basic structure of reality,
but to reawaken the complexity and depth of reality by highlighting “the limitations of our
modern way of looking at things, so that we might ‘transcend’ these limitations” (Marshall 58).

Phenomenology.
2
Husserl’s transcendental consciousness diverges from Kantian transcendence, which makes the
world immanent in the subject, precluding a sense of wonder toward the world. The
transcendental consciousness proceeding from such wonder evinces the impossibility of a
complete phenomenological analysis of experience (Merleau-Ponty xiv).
5

This project challenges the determinate empirical and intellectual approaches to the problem of
being: for the former, the real is only what has been experienced; the latter only allows for a
single, determinate conception of meaning. Merleau-Ponty takes issue with these limiting
approaches and instead offers a “philosophy of ambiguity,” which allows for an indeterminate
being, one that is always present in its absence and creates a complex reality in compelling the
phenomenologist to persistently seek its meaning (ibid.). In this methodology, the incessant quest
for the ambiguous being results in the accumulation of meanings, which are then challenged,
replaced, or adjusted as new meanings are incorporated. This process complicates the instinct to
uncritically perceive the world: the phenomenologist recognizes the limitations inherent in “our
modern way of looking at things” and consciously continues seeking the reality of the
indeterminate being. As an act with a permanent beginning, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological
perception makes possible a fluctuating meaning and appearance of the object. This ambiguous
approach to being gives way to a more accurate portrayal of reality, which is itself unstable.
The complexity of reality is especially visible in the intersection of my various
experiences and acquired meanings with those of the other. My perception of the world thus
becomes imbued with new and often conflicting meanings. If I am to allow for the possibility of
an indeterminate world, then I need to understand the world as constituted by more than my own
consciousness. In order to accept a plurality of consciousnesses, I must conceive my
consciousness as inherent in “its body and its world”: that is, my consciousness possesses a
body, which then allows my consciousness to become a self. This done, I am then able to accept
that other consciousnesses also inhabit other bodies (Merleau-Ponty 351). Thus, the other
becomes not only a perceived object in space, but also an object possessing its own self, making
intersubjectivity possible. As a self – as a consciousness with a body – the other can experience

6

the world as I do, but necessarily derives different meanings from those experiences: because the
other is an other, a certain solipsism delimits my perception of the world, implying a perpetual
difference between my experience and the other’s. The intersecting and engaging of my
experiences and the other’s through communication merges our respective meanings, indicating
a lived world more complex than I had originally perceived.
Merleau-Ponty requires the establishment of common ground for productive – that is,
meaningful – communication. His common ground materializes in the potential for two
individuals to share an experience – the significance is in the potential more than the literal
sharing of an experience. Two strangers will almost definitely differ in the experiences that have
shaped their selves, but Merleau-Ponty understands the very potentiality as necessary in creating
a common ground. Communication on common ground will be built on shared or near meanings
and thoughts – expressed as speech – will be deemed intelligible by each individual. While the
existence of infinite other selves seems to complicate the establishment of common ground, the
prevalence of normative modes of thought increases the potential for shared meanings between
two individuals. When one individual does not adhere to the norm, however, communication
with the other becomes a challenge.

II. Complicating Gender
As a result of the plurality of selves and unproductive communication, the “truth” of
reality and its stability become uncertain. This project will dwell on the unstable reality of gender
categories. The gender system of the Western world gets its meaning from a heteronormative
binary. Based on the biologically sexed body, this binary recognizes two legitimate gender
identities: female and male. Because the stability of Western reality depends on the gender
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binary, society enforces adherence to given norms – those phenomena that “represent the average
or ideal towards which all other phenomena move” (Mary Poovey qtd. in Butler, Undoing 50).
The imposition of normative behaviors creates a structure in which delinquent gender identities
and performances are extremely apparent. The general term that stands for so-called gender
delinquency is transgender. Judith Halberstam describes transgender as “a gender identity that is
at least partially defined by transitivity” (161). Gender transitivity can emerge as the crossing or
blending of gender categories, physical gender movement through surgery, or the movement
away from binary boundaries. The transgender category includes transsexuals; cross dressers;
androgynous, nonbinary, agender, and genderqueer individuals; and intersexed individuals.
These all are gender experiences that subvert the traditional conception of a binary gender and
thus threaten a stable Western reality. For this paper, I will use the term “nonbinary” to mean any
gender identity that does not fall on the binary spectrum – thus, it will not include, for example,
transgender individuals who identify as women or men.
In one way or another, these transgressive gender identities relate themselves back to the
binary, as Kate Bornstein says of androgyny: “Androgyny assumes that there’s male stuff on one
side of a spectrum and female stuff on another side of that spectrum. And somewhere in the
middle of this straight line, there’s an ideal blend of ‘male’ and ‘female.’ However, by saying
there’s a ‘middle,’ androgyny really keeps the opposites in place” (115). Androgyny – as well as
male-to-female and female-to-male transsexuality – reifies the gender binary in its need of the
spectrum for its definition. Although nonbinary identities dislocate themselves from the binary
continuum in a way that other transgender identities do not, they too require the existence of that
continuum: without a gender binary, “nonbinary” would be meaningless. Does nonbinary also
reify the gender binary? Certainly, the existence of identities that refuse the female and male
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classifications poses the possibility that the gender binary is in fact unreal. At the same time the
necessary acknowledgement of these classifications allows the gender binary continued
existence, if only as a social construction.
While the nonbinary identity recognizes the reality of the binary (and its consequences),
it nonetheless complicates the validity of the Western ideal of gender. As with all transgender
identities, nonbinary does not follow a predetermined gender narrative; indeed, its very
divergence from the binary suggests that the nonbinary experience is not mappable at all. Much
of the binary system is built on the assumption that gender naturally follows from primary sex
characteristics and thereafter remains immutable. In some cases, the sexual surface is ambiguous,
as is the case with some intersexed individuals. Such unintelligible bodies are punished –
through surgery or physical violence – in an attempt to emphasize the significance of the body in
assigning gender, which, in turn, plays a critical role in social organization.
For Sigmund Freud the reality of the intersexed body confounds the link between the
visible sexual surface and the medical “truth” of physiology: where a sexual configuration does
not adhere to binary expectations – and, moreover, the explicitly established expectations of the
medical complex – “truth" becomes an unstable construct (7). The same confounding might be
seen in the link between a nonbinary gender performance and the “truth” of the binary matrix. A
gendered performance is first perceived at the surface of the body: the visual image presents
itself before other aspects of the perceptual object become known. This initial image can be read
– by the binary other – as situated within the binary matrix. Assigning a binary gender based on
an indeterminate performance may be a struggle for the binary other, but because the hegemonic
matrix constricts its subjects, binary readings seem to be the only feasible option. However, this
other will still recognize the incoherence in the nonbinary performance, and such a performance
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pushes “us up against the limits of gendered representation: the limits of what about gender we
can consign to representation, of what we can process as identity in the visual” (Prosser 223).
Faced with a performance that exceeds these limits, the binary other is either deeply disturbed or
compelled to reevaluate their conception of “truth.”
Gender ambiguity causes “loss of cognitive orientation” in the binary other: “People will
regard any phenomenon that produces this disorientation as ‘disgusting’ or ‘dirty.’ To be so
regarded, however, the phenomenon must threaten to destroy not only one of their fundamental
cognitive categories but their whole cognitive system” (Murray S. Davis qtd. in Bornstein 72).
The binary cognitive system depends on the matrix that determines the templates for social
interactions, such as in business, academic, or romantic relationships. When presented with a
non-normative gendered being, the binary other has the option to reject or incorporate the
perceived meanings into their understanding of the world; the cognitive disorientation, however,
often causes a fear or discomfort that impedes acceptance. The cognitive orientation established
by a stable gender system hinges on the exclusivity of binary categories; thus the very possibility
of nonbinary identities disrupts the promise of security – hence the violent retribution many
gender transgressors face.

III. Perceiving the Nonbinary
As a tool for understanding perception, phenomenology allows for a critical examination
of what creates gender in the social mind. The pursuit of meaning in the nonbinary being with an
ambiguous approach to perception precludes the possibility of a definitive “truth.” By accepting
the possibility of an indeterminate gendered being, the phenomenologist can investigate the signs
that inform our understanding of gender while critically aware of the presupposed facticity of the
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binary system. The perceived indeterminate being will not, therefore, be limited by unreflective
conceptions; the unending search for meaning in the nonbinary being leads to an blended image
whose very incoherence suggests that binary gendered signs do not have an definitive basis.
Thus the investigation of nonbinary reveals the tenuous stability of the binary gender system.
Transcending the limitations of modern perception opens up an exploration of nonbinary
identities at their points of contact with the binary matrix. Identifiable conflicts or disruptions
highlight the constructedness of gender: gender identities that violate the binary have the ability
to elicit conflict because they represent a threat to the power structure defined by the binary
matrix. The enforcement of the gender binary is always in the service of established power
structures: not only does it maintain the male/female hierarchy but it also delimits the gendered
norms that determine the shape of those structures (Whittle 210). The reality of gendered beings
existing outside the binary delegitimizes the regulatory mechanism that establishes the “natural
truth” of those hierarchies.
Chapter Two will utilize Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of ambiguous perception to
investigate the incoherent nonbinary selves depicted in a collection of personal essays. Gender
Failure – originally a spoken word performance – portrays the nonbinary lives of Rae Spoon and
Ivan Coyote. The memoirs that make up Gender Failure offer an intimate glimpse into the
subjective and intersubjective experiences of the binary world. Tracing the points of contact
between the nonbinary existences of the authors and the binary matrix demonstrates the
difficulty of living an authentic nonbinary life within that matrix. Even as they reveal the
instability of the binary, Spoon and Coyote's narratives emphasize the constriction of norms and
expectations that precipitate illegible gender performances.
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A phenomenology of perception begins to approach the origins of gender: by dismantling
the immutability of the binary, the phenomenologist can locate the signs that inform readings of
gendered bodies and ultimately recognize how those signs reinforce the hierarchal power
structure. In order to understand the extent of Spoon and Coyote’s supposed gender delinquency,
Merleau-Ponty’s ambiguous perception must take into account the intersubjectivity of identity
formation. In order for the nonbinary self to understand and define their identity, they require the
binary other’s perception of and subsequent reading of their body: the other’s interpretation will
mark the nonbinary body as nonconforming, a classification that determines the nonbinary self’s
situation in and experience of the external world. Just as my reading of the other brings them into
being for me, I come into being for the other: embodiment is always intersubjective (Salamon
46).
Merleau-Ponty’s focus on intersubjectivity implies that the two individuals have the
ability to establish common ground: that self and other share or could share similar
interpretations of signs and objects. However, in the case of the meeting of nonbinary and binary
individuals, common ground cannot be located because the binary other – having never
experienced the binary from outside – will not be able to comprehend the reality of the nonbinary
experience. This obstacle is further complicated by the language barrier present in the nonbinary
self’s articulation; because the language used by the nonbinary self originates from within the
binary, binary others will always overlay the self’s words with their own meanings. Thus, there
is incommensurability in the interactions between nonbinary self and binary other. This division
necessarily implies an insufficient empathy in such interactions; this means the binary other
possesses a fragmented understanding of the nonbinary existence such that, even when the other
allows that existence, the nonbinary self’s ultimate illegibility precludes its validity in terms of
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the gender binary. The aim of this project is to demonstrate the social isolation of the nonbinary
existence in terms of its illegibility – as seen in Gender Failure – while also proposing means for
making space for such existences within the binary matrix.

About pronouns: Because of their position outside the gender binary, nonbinary individuals
frequently prefer personal pronouns that reflect that position. Gender-neutral pronouns range
from the familiar (they/them/theirs) to the unfamiliar (zi/zir/zirs). To avoid confusion – and
because Spoon and Coyote have explicitly stated their preferences – I will use the third-person
singular pronoun “they” when speaking about nonbinary individuals. However, “they” will also
be used in its traditional binary – singular and plural – forms in this paper; to the best of my
ability (given the constraints of language) I will make it clear what “they” refers to.
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Chapter One
How Do You Tell the Truth?: Constructing a Nonbinary Self in a Binary World
To live as nonbinary – without and against the gender binary – the self must negotiate a
social system that seeks to delegitimize its existence. Performing and articulating an
unauthorized gender in a system structured by fixed binary meanings implies a necessary
revision of perceptual mechanisms. The nonbinary self – itself filtered through hegemonic modes
of thought – faces perpetual erasure of its reality by the binary other’s interpretation of their
gendered performance: in being offered up to an alien gaze, the body risks being stolen from its
reality (Merleau-Ponty 167). When the nonbinary self performs an identity that appears
delinquent in regulatory social contexts, the other does not recognize an intelligible being;
consequently, the self becomes marked as less than human – a being denied personhood.
The unintelligibility between self and other arises from dissonant meanings. Because the
nonbinary self moves within a heteronormative binary matrix, its intentions oppose the available
meanings with which the other perceives the world. This incommensurable relationship leaves
the self at risk of unintelligibility: the nonbinary self necessarily relies on binary signs for its
performance, precipitating the attribution of binary meanings. Thus the structure of the gender
binary invalidates the reality of the nonbinary. The binary other experiences the world according
to fixed gender norms instituted by a regulatory apparatus. Its instinct to look for normativity in a
gendered performance supports the goals of such an apparatus – namely, to produce the image of
a stable gendered “truth.”
In social encounters, the initial visual perception is the site of contact between self and
other, and the product of that perceptive act lays the foundation for the self’s potential
intelligibility. Gender expression, in the form of bodily cues and signs, inform the other’s
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reading, which precedes the constitution of a unified being. In the first moments of an
interaction, the observer will instinctively seek out the gender of the self: establishing this
identity categorization is crucial for determining how to understand and behave toward a social
object, and failing to comprehend it causes extreme discomfort in the observer (Crawley et al
37). Without the rubric of binary gender, the regulatory script of social interactions falls away
and the immutable “truth” of gender, the persistence of which allows for an exclusive category of
“personhood,” becomes destabilized.
Socially sanctioned gender performances – and the successful execution thereof –
delineate the criteria for personhood. Consequently the conceptual “person” is constituted by the
very apparatus that imposes a stable binary; Judith Butler asks: “To what extent do regulatory
practices of gender formation and division constitute identity, the internal coherence of the
subject, indeed, the self-identical status of the person? [...] And how do the regulatory practices
that govern gender also govern culturally intelligible notions of identity?” In other words, when
“identity” is assured through stabilizing concepts, “the person” is called into question by
incoherent or discontinuous gendered beings “who appear to be persons but who fail to conform
to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined” (Butler, Gender
Trouble 23).
The nonbinary self threatens the legitimacy of the gender binary: indeed, the very
existence of this self precludes the stability of the binary. When regulatory practices are rejected
and the nonbinary reality disrupts “the regulatory fiction of heterosexual coherence, it seems that
the expressive model loses its descriptive force. That regulatory ideal is then exposed as a norm
and a fiction that disguises itself as a developmental law regulating the sexual field that it
purports to describe” (Butler, Gender 185). The revelation of this fiction suggests that the notion
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of the “person” and even reality itself has been constricted in service to the maintenance of a
hierarchal power structure.
Restricted by this framework, the nonbinary self must actively construct itself as a viable
person. To do this means addressing the perceptive act as normalized by the binary apparatus.
The nonbinary self, aware of its inhuman status, presents its identifying self with a selfconsciousness not possessed by binary individuals. Thus it has the ability to alter and
recontextualize binary meanings in its performance and articulation of self. Understanding the
conduct of the nonbinary self facilitates a phenomenological investigation of gender as a system.
Where the binary would have its subjects defined as determinate beings, following MerleauPonty’s method of ambiguity urges the phenomenologist to seek out the infinite meanings that
constitute the nonbinary self; as this perpetual process unfolds, the phenomenologist transcends
the limitations set by the binary. Effecting this mode of perception allows a move toward the
origins of gendered meanings, thereby expanding the conceptual reality and legitimizing the
nonbinary existence.

I. Where Does Gender Come From and What Does It Want?
Where gendered meanings derive from perception, the bodily surface of the other is the
primary object; that object is the site of visual cues, the contexts of which inform our
interpretation. The other – even before speaking – becomes a meaningful figure as a result of my
reading of their body. Of all the cues I might find presented by the other, gendered attributes
seem the most straightforward. In observing the other, I can pick out certain attributes – e.g.
hairstyle, clothing, body language – that will tell me whether to gender the other as male or
female. It may happen that the other presents a blend of gendered attributes; regardless, as a
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subject of the binary matrix, I will categorize the other as either male or female, based on the
meanings I already possess.
Consider this example: While grocery shopping, I observe an individual of middling
height, with long electric pink hair and a beard, wearing makeup and Carhartts, and walking in a
way that evinces femininity. The gendered attributes that appear at the surface of this body
conflict with one another, resisting my initial effort to categorize. The presence of the beard
however, strongly suggests a particular genetic makeup, and so declares the ‘real’ gender of this
individual. The binary instinct to equate gender with sex prioritizes visible sex characteristics in
the act of assigning a gender. This process often leads to misreadings of gender performances,
which are the result of the “negotiation between the individual’s gender identity and the
limitations of the socially sanctioned binary sexes and gender” (Davidmann 197).
According to Western society, socially sanctioned gender identities proceed from the
biological “fact” of sex. Two primary approaches to understanding of gender are based on this
correlation: essentialism and social constructionism. Gender essentialism maintains “that men
and women have inherent, unique, and natural attributes that qualify them as their separate
genders” (Jakubowski). In this framework, then, gender equals sex: gendered identities and
characteristics are predetermined by biology, and because the sexed body apparently can only
take one of two forms – either naturally or surgically – this necessarily means that only two
genders exist. Thus the existence of a binary implies that gender mirrors sex or is in some way
restricted by it (Butler, Gender 9):3 when sex determines gender, nonbinary identities are an
impossibility. These identities deviate from nature in their presentation, but, according to gender
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Sex itself can be categorized as a socially constructed binary, as exemplified in the coerced
surgical reconstruction of an intersexed newborn’s genitalia. See Butler, Gender 59-67.
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essentialism, such an identity still is actually binary: one only needs to look close enough to
determine the “truth” of the body to reveal the gender (Kessler and McKenna).4
The binary matrix embodies this understanding of gender: in order to enforce binary
genders, a regulatory apparatus would require the conception of a “natural” gender for the
denotation of “normal.” The reliance on anatomical or chromosomal sex to define “normal”
suggests that gender is an immutable category, thereby restricting the range of acceptable human
experience. However, the reality of gender transgressors demonstrates that the physical body is
not the “actual” source or indicator of gender.
Social constructionism finds that source in the social forces that contribute to the
collective conception of “normal.” In this model, gender is not considered an essential and
biological quality – although membership in arbitrary gender categories is, as it happens,
determined by the configuration of sexed bodies. Butler, a social constructionist, considers
gender “the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid
regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort
of being” (Gender 45). A “typical” gendered body – “a natural sort of being” – emerges from the
regulating forces of the external social world. These forces manifest as gender norms, the ideals
that delineate socially acceptable gendered presentations and behaviors. Gender norms are not
just laws but ways of knowing, modes of truth that forcibly define intelligibility (Butler, Undoing
57). The nonbinary self visibly flouts regulatory norms, so generating their unintelligible gender
identity and their apparent challenging of the binary and the power it represents.

4

Gender essentialism could be said to allow for transsexuals, provided the body is surgically
altered to become the “right” sex. Even so, individuals whose identity presentation includes
physical alteration subvert the idea of an intrinsic relationship between gender and sex.
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Compliance with and enforcement of the norms that define “normal” is always in the
service of an established power structure: for example, compulsory gendering within the
male/female dynamic perpetuates the apparent supremacy of men over women (Whittle 210). As
a binary system, Western society is built on such sets of either/or dynamics, the construction of
which implies that the first value possesses a “primary” status. The efficacy of this hierarchal
system cannot withstand a third – or fourth, or fifth – quantity; a social trinary would not have
the legitimate organizational power inherent in a binary because the supremacy marking the
higher value would necessarily lose its potency as more values are added to the equation. This
means nonbinary identities cannot be recognized by a system that acquires its authority from a
binary hierarchy.
Thus binary norms are strictly enforced. Individuals who do not perform a gender
according to socially sanctioned norms are punished, psychically and/or physically. Butler
believes that those who violently reinforce the binary have some stake in the immutability of
gender categories: “If a person opposes norms of binary gender not just by having a critical point
of view about them, but by incorporating norms critically, and that stylized opposition is legible,
then it seems that violence emerges precisely as the demand to undo that legibility” (35). In other
words, if the nonbinary performance is in fact legible – if the binary other recognizes it as a
gender identity – then that very legibility signals the fictitiousness of a stable gender system.
Again, the revelation of that fictitious nature threatens the security that an immutable truth
affords – policing and violence serve as tools for maintaining the “truth.”
The essentialist and constructionist approaches to gender, however, do not accurately
define the origins of gender on their own. If gender essentialism were the rule, transgender
identities of any kind would not exist; likewise, if gender proceeded solely from social
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construction, the only genders would be those that adhered to sanctioned norms. As biologist
Julia Serano asks, “[If] socialization artificially brainwashes all of us into becoming heterosexual
masculine men and feminine women, then how do you explain the existence of fabulous bisexual
femme-tomboy transsexual women such as myself?” (qtd. in Jakubowski). The answer must then
be that gender is a product of both an inborn essence and external social forces. While the degree
of each influence depends on the individual, both contribute to the gendering of the self (ibid.).
Nonbinary identities exemplify this model: they arise independently of biological sex and, as
Serano quips, social construction clearly cannot and does not condition all gendered selves. As
the paragon of this gendering process, nonbinary serves as evidence that both essentialism and
constructionism limit the reality of gender experiences.
Regulatory norms, proceeding from gender essentialism or constructionism, impose “a
model of coherent gendered life that demeans the complex ways in which gendered lives are
crafted and lived” (Butler, Undoing 5). Gendered beings do not possess a “core” gender identity
that directs their existence; nor do they exist only in terms of social regulation. Both possibilities
ignore the reality of complex gender experiences: despite the efforts of the binary matrix, nonnormative gender identities abound. Due to compulsive adherence to hegemonic expectations
and performance of heteronormative gendered acts, the full breadth of human experience
remains unexplored. The repetition of socially sanctioned, regulatory gender acts – which are
then legible as either female or male – legitimizes those acts as normative; thus exact repetition
of those acts is required for a self to be granted personhood. However, because acts are repeated
across time and contexts, gender necessarily becomes an unstable identity, subject to
resignification and non-normative repetitions (Butler, Trouble 188). The non-normative
repetitions of the nonbinary self reveal the “truth” represented by the gender binary to be
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baseless: by merely having the ability to challenge the “truth” of the binary, the nonbinary self
demonstrates the legitimacy of their gender identity.

II. Binary Perception and Nonbinary Illegibility
I experience the world with a sensual awareness: my body encounters sights, sounds, and
smells that construct it as a perceiving and perceived being. The accumulation of such
encounters brings together a world that begins to define my self. I cannot deliberately construct
this world as an extension of myself; instead, it serves as a permanent background against which
I perceive objects and am perceived (Merleau-Ponty xvii). The perceptive act is not merely the
sensual awareness of the world around me, but also the product of the unconscious acquisition
and synthesis of meaning based on my direct experience with that world in the very moment that
I experience it. Through sight, sounds, and spatial and temporal experiences, lived as I move
throughout the world, my consciousness assembles meanings that reconstruct my objective body
into a subjective being.
The meanings I draw upon for perception stem from two basic sources. First, from my
individual meanings, which are subjective and acquired from my direct experience of the world.
Although some experiences, and therefore their meanings, are in some way universal, the self’s
consciousness interprets them in a way that renders them unique to the individual. For example,
when I experience a color called “red,” my consciousness perceives that color and assigns a
meaning to the phenomenon of redness; these meanings will be associated with my visual
perception of the color itself, but may also include the (socially-informed) feelings of red (e.g.
love, anger, heat, etc.). Thereafter, I will experience redness as a product of the meanings I
already possess. However, although redness is a universal experience, my meanings will be
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vastly different from those of, say, a blind individual: “red” is still experienced by both our
consciousnesses, but I cannot say that the other shares my meaning.
Alternately, imposed meanings (as by a regulatory apparatus) dictate the meaning one
should read in a given sign; this establishes the conditions under which a given experience of a
sign is considered “correct.” For most, such prescribed meanings come naturally and so their
perception of the world meets the expectations of the regulatory apparatus. In this context
meanings are understood as universally shared, such that deviations are obvious. Nonconforming
meanings, then, inform perceptions and experiences of the world that threaten “truth” and its
promise of stability. For example, using the binary matrix as a benchmark, meanings that deviate
from this norm – i.e. those that define the nonbinary self – produce an experience of the world
that reveals a precarious binary reality. The rejection of these socially imposed meanings marks
the nonbinary self and its experience of the world as delinquent.
The above forms of meaning render the world as I perceive and experience it subject to
my existence as a discrete self. The discreteness of my self – and thereby of the other, who
possesses their own discrete self – complicates the perceptive act. The distinction between self
and other constitutes the asymmetry that characterizes the intersubjectivity of perception. While
the possibility of a common ground is essential in perceiving accurate meaning in the other’s
language, it is also crucial in perceiving an intelligible being in the other’s performance of self.
The other comes into being for me in the attribution of my “ready-made” meanings; just as the
other can only speak to me in a language I already understand, so too can the other only
physically articulate their self with a body I find legible. This legibility depends on
commensurate meanings. Because of the inherent individuality of the subjective self, comparable
meanings shared with the other cannot be guaranteed. However, when experiences and meanings
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originate in a regulatory apparatus – the gender binary, for example – bodies are more likely to
be legible.
In terms of an indeterminate phenomenology, achieving legibility may be complicated by
the perpetual perceptive act. The indeterminate being presupposed by Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophy of ambiguity is composed of infinite profiles, and the other that is immediately
available for me is always only seen in the act of seeing them. There are always unseen aspects
of the other and to attempt to perceive them as a whole is a futile task; thus my perception of the
other is never accurate. However, the other does not appear to me as a complete unknown: I
perceive the other as a coherent whole through a synthesis of retained and anticipated profiles
(Detmer 103). The very coherence of these profiles confirms the legibility of the other. This
process, though, only succeeds when the anticipated profiles align with what is already known:
the binary other cannot anticipate the unseen profiles of the nonbinary self – including gender
identity and gender history – because that anticipation presupposes a universal binary
experience. Thus the various aspects of the nonbinary self cannot cohere in the binary other’s
perception, revealing an unintelligible being.
As a result of this binary perception, the nonbinary self experiences the world as an
apparently incoherent being. They understand that the binary other cannot find meaning in their
existence – or, to be more precise, the meaning the binary other does find creates the image of a
delinquent binary self. The other’s perception of the self is the foundational act in constituting a
social being. In intersubjective encounters, the initial impulse is to look for information in the
body of the other, or bring into play information already possessed. This information “helps to
define the situation, enabling others to know in advance what he will expect of them and what
they may expect of him. Informed in these ways, the others will know how best to act in order to
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call forth a desired response from him” (Goffman 1).5 My appearance, attitude, and language
will become meaningful for the other based on their past experiences. The self they perceive in
my performance is therefore subject to the meanings they already possess, which may or may not
produce an accurate representation.
The information the other finds in their initial perception of my body determines how our
encounter will unfold. Sociologist Erving Goffman’s model shows the significance of that first
image: every aspect of my interaction with the other will be defined according to their perception
of me. In a split second and a cursory glance, I have become a self in the eyes of the other.
Whether that self is an accurate representation of my identity depends on the origin of their
individual meanings. The other’s subsequent behavior toward me will demonstrate not only the
signs they read on my body but also the meanings that have already been ascribed to them. The
body I present for the other’s perception is an embodied articulation of the self I understand
myself to be. As this embodied self, I learn how to interact with the world around me in a way
that is authentic to my identity. The other’s response to my performance relays a second image
of my self: I see in their behavior toward me my self as they perceive it. Confronted with the
image, I am dislocated from my solipsistic existence and the coherent perception I had of my self
must be adjusted. The legibility of my social self is always contingent on the other’s gaze.
Intelligibility derived from the perceptive process depends on established meanings,
especially those that have been set by a regulatory apparatus. The nonbinary self upsets this
framework: operating from outside these limiting boundaries, the nonbinary self presents a body
that defies binary readings. The resulting perception is an amalgamation of nonbinary identity
and binary meanings. This incoherent being – and the reality of its existence – demonstrates the

5

These are the pronouns used in Dr Goffman’s original text.
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extent of the constricting perceptive apparatus set by the binary. Thus perceptions from within
the matrix threaten the nonbinary self: if their social performance is always read according to
binary meanings, can a nonbinary self be considered legitimate? In order to encourage an
accurate reading of their self, the nonbinary individual must take up the task of self-articulation.

III. Articulating the Nonbinary Self
Self-articulation is the visual or verbal building-up of oneself with the aim of directing
the other’s perception. Wearing a certain band t-shirt or claiming an identity label (e.g. queer,
punk, athlete) are modes of self-articulation: each is meant to underscore parts of an individual’s
identity in the eyes of the other. Articulation assumes that the self the other reads in my
performance is inaccurate, such that I must provide additional signs in the hope that the other
will attribute a meaning that meets my intention. The project of self-articulation aims to present a
self’s truth in a way that the other understands it as true-for-me. Making the truth understandable
depends on how you tell the truth. The truth needs to be communicated or performed in such a
way that the culture can hear it (Bornstein 95). When the culture cannot hear the truth – when the
culture’s sanctioned vocabulary limits reality – self-articulation struggles for validation.
Articulation is especially important for nonbinary individuals seeking understanding
within the binary matrix. The limiting binary framework the nonbinary self comes up against
affords little space for an articulation of an atypical existence. Butler’s assessment of this
framework suggests that it not only limits reality but also the imagined reality:
The limits of the discursive analysis of gender presuppose and preempt the
possibilities of imaginable and realizable gender configurations within culture. [...]
These limits are always set within the terms of a hegemonic cultural discourse
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predicated on binary structures that appear as the language of universal rationality.
Constraint is thus built into what that language constitutes as the imaginable
domain of gender. (Gender 12)
Thus nonbinary as a category has neither the space nor even the vocabulary to articulate itself as
a viable style of existence. Because the hegemonic discourse is “predicated on binary structures,”
the available tools for nonbinary articulation are always already imbued with binary meanings.
When established by fixed meanings, language, as the system for delimiting conceptual
categories, constricts feasible reality: as an unimaginable identity category, nonbinary struggles
to be articulated in a way that demonstrates its legitimacy.
Meant to be an act of agency, articulation challenges the nonbinary self to forcibly make
space for their existence. The visual and verbal articulation directs the other to perceive the
presented self according to the self’s intentions. In doing so, the other is expected to attribute
meanings to the body toward an accurate perception of the self. Although the self has greater
influence over the other in the project of articulation, they still cannot dictate the meanings that
the other reads in the body. For the nonbinary self, the visual and verbal signs available for
articulation already contain meaning for the binary other. This puts the nonbinary self in the
position of speaking from a non-space, using a language that belongs to someone else.
Validation of personhood proceeds from self-articulation; consequently the nonbinary
self has a lot at stake in a successful articulation. The other’s perception determines how the
nonbinary self is perceived as a social being; but the intersubjective constitution of self means
that the other also has a role in determining how one perceives their selfhood and therefore how
they experience the world: the binary other’s perception influences both the self-as-perceived
and the self-as-lived. Thus a successful articulation of self – and the subsequent validation of
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personhood – depends on the other: the social self cannot exist without external input. If they
cannot persuade the other towards an accurate reading of their performance, the nonbinary self
faces unviability.
The nonbinary self has two means for self-articulation: the presentation of their body, and
their use of language. As the initial site of perceptive contact, the body serves as the principal
mode of self-articulation. The body is the means for performing the self, and we perform the self
we believe ourselves to be; however, that is not always the self that the other perceives (Salamon
3). The fundamental image of the self produces signs onto which the other will assign their own
meanings: these meanings, unique to the other, almost never afford an accurate representation of
the self. In a social setting, the immediately visible gender presentation – as opposed to the
reality of chromosomal makeup, anatomical sex, or gender history – is impossible to ignore
(Kessler and McKenna). Gendering the other always precedes the perception of a unified being.
The normative behaviors that delineate the binary identity seem to be “natural” as a result of
social construction; thus the constitution of the binary gender performance lacks the selfconsciousness that the nonbinary performance requires. The nonbinary self is always aware of
the significance of that initial perception: if the body does not appear legible, the validity of the
nonbinary identity is already at risk.
Physical articulation is limited by the visible body and marked by normative gender
characteristics such as clothing, hairstyle, and body language. Ostensibly, the individual has
control over the presentation of these elements; however, as a social object, the perception of the
other ultimately delineates the self. Butler calls these conditions a “lively paradox,” an existence
where “my body is and is not mine” (Undoing 21). For example, a nonbinary individual who
presents their body in a certain way – self-consciously constructing its appearance and the way it
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moves – intends for it to serve as a visual representation of their self; the binary other, however,
will read in that same body a self that is in some way binary, perhaps a woman who presents an
androgynous body. Regardless of the self's agency in its bodily articulation, the other will always
tend towards its own intentions. Caught between identity and the binary matrix, the nonbinary
self struggles toward an accurate projection of that self.
While bodily articulation is a significant element in the establishment of an accurately
perceived self, the nonbinary individual also relies on linguistic tools. In verbal communication,
“the meaning swallows up the signs”; that is, thought, as expressed by speech, becomes lost in
the meanings it represents. These signs, which a consciousness takes in, can only take shape
through “already available meanings” (Merleau-Ponty 183-4). In other words, verbal
communication is an automatic task in which meanings are uncritically attached to signifying
speech. In the project of articulation, the nonbinary self understands that the meaning ascribed to
expressed thought always has binary origins. The language the nonbinary self uses to situate
their identity is consequently already familiar to the binary other; because that is the case, the
other instinctively calls up their ready-made meanings, overwriting those that the nonbinary self
intends.
Self-definition as a linguistic act attaches meanings to the verbal expression of thought,
defining the self according to the available linguistic context. For the Western world, the context
is absolutely binary. As a result, expressed thoughts are always interpreted on the binary’s terms.
For the nonbinary self, self-definition means defining “that which escapes language through the
use of language itself” (Salamon 83). Dialogue with the other establishes a common ground –
through the sharing of thoughts and resultant merging of perspectives – that makes
communication possible. In conversation between nonbinary self and the binary other, though,
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there is always a discrepancy in styles of thought and perception such that any ground reached
will necessarily be uneven. The nonbinary self that one articulates cannot materialize if the styles
of thought are not shared; in other words, the binary other cannot comprehend the nonbinary self
because their consciousness always thinks according to the binary.
Constrained in this way, articulation seems to do little more than invalidate the nonbinary
self. The use of binary tools would suggest that, at least linguistically, nonbinary is not a
legitimate conceptual category. Without a designated vocabulary, the nonbinary self must rely on
the language of a system that seeks to erase its existence. However, the nonbinary use of binary
tools does not necessarily represent concession; in fact, this critical recontextualization
destabilizes a supposedly immutable framework. Articulation of a gender-displaced existence
breaks down the boundaries that limit imaginable genders: the articulation and performance of a
gender by one who does not conform to binary expectations deploys and redistributes binary
terms, and that redistribution disrupts and proliferates those terms outside the binary itself
(Butler Gender 32). By proliferating and recontexualizing binary tools, nonbinary articulation
reveals the arbitrary construction of the binary system: though the signified meanings belong to a
discourse that preempts the reality of non-normative genders, the deliberate shifting of the signs
outside the binary as a means for articulation suggests that their meanings have a flexibility not
sanctioned by the regulatory binary apparatus.
As a means of building-up the self, articulation has the potential to direct the other toward
an accurate perception of a performed identity. For the nonbinary individual, self-articulation
allows for agency in the face of the other's gaze. In deliberately constructing their physical
appearance, the nonbinary self can control the signs available on their body; by critically
utilizing language and the nonbinary self can persuade the other toward an accurate reading of
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those signs. Both methods serve as critical measures in the realization of the self. However,
operating within a binary world means that there are plenty of opportunities for the nonbinary
self to be misunderstood. Recognizing the difficulty in articulating the nonbinary self is crucial
for understanding the conceptual incommensurability between nonbinary self and binary other.

IV. Locating the Nonbinary “I”
The project of self-articulation aims to provide an accurate representation of the self; in
doing so, the other may be directed toward the self’s performative intentions. The subjective
pronoun of self-articulation is “I”: using the linguistic construction “I am,” the self establishes a
conceptual image of their identity. Philosopher George Herbert Mead suggests that the “I”
cannot be an object of consciousness: although it informs the articulated identity, the nonbinary
“I” is not an attainable concept itself. Where, then, does the “I” come from, and how does it
translate to a performed self?
In “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness,” Mead differentiates between the “me” and
the “I” of the self, where “me” is the social projection and “I” is the essential self. This “me”
stands for the embodied consciousness that interacts with the world. Its building-up is
intersubjective: the possibility of a verbal gesture affecting the self as it does the other serves as
the essential foundation of “me” (140). Mead’s conception of “me” therefore depends on
Merleau-Ponty’s common ground. Where common ground cannot be attained – as between
nonbinary and binary selves – the viability of “me” becomes threatened. If my “me,” as a social
object, cannot be perceived as an intelligible binary being, the other will overwrite the reality of
my nonbinary self. “Me” only comes into existence by way of the other’s reading of my
performed self: it is always uncertain, subject to the imposition of binary meanings.
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Mead’s “I,” then, is the unseen and unknowable essence that constructs “me.” “I” is
always out of the reach of my consciousness; instead, the very existence of the “me” implies the
existence of an “I.” Mead likens the “I” to Kant’s transcendental inner self: that is, the “inner
sense” which creates a consciousness of “oneself only as one appears to oneself, not as one is”
(Mead 141; Brook).6 The “I” is what one is, the governing essential self that produces “me”:
thus “me,” is always only a near representation of “I.” As the embodied consciousness, my “me”
(the self I understand myself to be and that I present to the world) is not me (my essential self)
but rather the constructed image based on the social experiences filtered through that essential
self (“I”). Experiences of the world – including the influence of social regulatory practices –
inform the “I,” which in turn establishes the performance of the “me.”
Butler also conceives the “I” as an unconscious entity constructed by external forces,
although she does not see a distinction between it and the “me.” She suggests that “the
possibility of my persistence as an ‘I’ depends upon my being able to do something with what is
done with me” (Undoing 3). In order to be a nonbinary “I” the self has to be able to do
something with the ways they are done by norms and the other’s binary perceptions: the
regulating practices evident in perception, self-articulation, and gender not only shape the self,
but also the contingency of an “I.” In the binary matrix, the nonbinary self comes into being
precisely because of what is done to the body. The intersubjective nature of perception constructs
an othered self, which then encounters corrective pressures in the act of articulating and
performing their self. Threatened by this framework, which seeks to erase the unintelligible, the
“I” must “do something” with what has been done to it in the interest of its continuation.
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To be an “I,” then, requires that something be done with norms. The nonbinary self,
though a product of regulating norms, also depends on norms for its existence; denying the
reality of this constituting condition, however, cannot establish the “I.” Rather, the “I” that I am
must endeavor “to live in ways that maintain a critical and transformative relation to [norms]”
(Undoing 3). The very nonbinary identity embodies an acute self-consciousness as a result of its
relation to the gender binary; thus the nonbinary self has the awareness to critically incorporate
norms into their identity. The deliberate nature of this incorporation subverts the purpose of
norms: where the binary apparatus seeks to construct homogeneous gendered beings, the critical
nonbinary implementation of binary norms in fact represents a commentary on the
constructedness and limited reality of sanctioned gender. In other words, the very manipulation
of norms destablizes the fiction of stable gender identities. As a being that cannot “be without
doing,” the nonbinary self becomes an “I” by doing norms critically (ibid).
This nonbinary realization necessarily meets resistance when conducted within the binary
matrix. The “I,” Butler concludes, becomes “threatened with unviability, with becoming undone
altogether, when it no longer incorporates the norm in such a way that makes this ‘I’ fully
recognizable” (Undoing 3). Norms, though done critically, must also preserve familiarity for the
binary other: the nonbinary self must take legibility as its goal in order to maintain a viable
personhood. Because the constitution of self is intersubjective, nonbinary utilization of norms
must accomplish intelligibility for the binary other.
The constrictive nature of the gender binary requires that the self perform an intelligible
(binary) gender before personhood can be granted. Constructing such a performance often means
the repression or erasure of the authentic identity. For some individuals, these conditions make
life unlivable – even more so than not being recognized as human at all. Thus, the nonbinary self
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may decide to distance itself from norms altogether rather than gain “a sense of intelligibility by
virtue of norms that will only do [the self] in from another direction” (Butler, Undoing 3). Doing
so may well make a sense of social belonging impossible, but the self will remain intact. This
refusal of intelligibility too works as a critical “doing” of gender norms; even as the consequent
nonbinary “I” precedes an unintelligible social “me,” the coherent self maintains its reality.
Doing norms through incorporation or refusal establishes a nonbinary “I”; if the goal is
personhood, though, the self must incorporate the limiting norms into an intelligible social
projection.
A cohesive self contains two constituting entities: the “me” and the “I.” As the publically
presented social object, “me” serves as the site of contact between nonbinary self and the binary
world. The self it performs is an approximation of the identity contained in the “I.” Although
always out of the reach on consciousness, “I” is shaped by both an “essential” self as well as the
regulating forces of the social world. The difference between “me” and “I” is significant for its
distinction between external and internal selves. My self For Others is always in the process of
“doing” norms: for example, Butler says that gender is constantly being done for or with the
other (Undoing 1). Because it is an intersubjectively constructed object, this external self is never
completely my own. The internal self – the For Myself – is the locus of my “truth.” Although “I”
is always being done by norms, it does not negotiate its own unity for intelligibility. Instead, the
“I” – in order to persist as an “I” – must mediate its projected “me” to appear intelligible to the
other.

V. Conclusion
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The empathetic gap between nonbinary self and binary other does not arise
spontaneously, but is actually the product of socially regulated norms that impose a limiting
reality. These norms structure and reinforce conceptual categories that determine what is
humanly possible (Crawley et al 87). Because the binary world does not allow space for what it
considers “inhuman,” the nonbinary self must make the self-conscious effort to perform its
identity – its internal “I” – in a way that the other can comprehend. However, without common
ground, which Merleau-Ponty requires for meaningful communication, accurate perception may
not be a possibility.
The nonbinary “I” has two primary challenges in achieving intelligibility for the binary
other. The first is the perceptive act, which is the crucial site of recognition. As the other
perceives the body of the self they unconsciously assign meanings to the signs they find there.
However, because the meanings the other calls up are already located in the binary, the authentic
identity of the perceived coherent self is overwritten, often with a delinquently gendered image.
Behavior toward the self reflects this perception: such delinquency is often punished, either
verbally or physically, in an effort to assert the immutability of the binary system. As the
conceived self is constituted through intersubjectivity, the nonbinary self becomes conscious of
its otherness, consequently perceiving and interacting with the world from the outside.
Because of this erasure of the nonbinary intentions, the self endeavors to articulate its
identity in order to clearly portray its truth. Even with this act of agency, one cannot direct the
binary other toward an accurate perception of the nonbinary self. Without the conceptual
foundation afforded by shared meanings, the other is not able to approach the possibility of such
a perception. The signs and tools available for self-articulation originate in the gender binary
such that any interpretation of the nonbinary self is constrained by that system’s established
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meanings. Thus the non-normative gendered performance of the nonbinary self marks it as
unintelligible, rending it inhuman in the eyes of the binary other. In order to be granted
personhood, nonbinary must take legibility as its performative goal.
All of this seems to suggest that nonbinary cannot exist as a legitimate social category.
Certainly, the very construction of the gender binary preempts the possibility of dislocated
identities. The nonbinary individual, as a subject in a binary social system, struggles to be
perceived as an accurate representation of their self. Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna
condense this dilemma when they wonder:
Could a person with a transgendered identity translate [that identity] into a public
transgendered attribution, where the attributor would say ‘That's neither a woman
nor a man,’ rather than ‘I can't tell if that's a woman or a man’? To cultivate such
an attribution in this third sense of transgender (beyond or through) is
extraordinarily difficult and might be impossible.
In its perception and articulation, the nonbinary self is always understood according to the
gender binary; thus the “cultivation” of a context in which the other might naturally read a
nonbinary body as neither/nor seems an impossibility. However, this does not mean that
nonbinary is necessarily an illegitimate gender category. Recontextualizing binary signs and
meanings serves as the nonbinary self’s entrance into a social world that denies its very
imaginability. Nonbinary becomes a conceptual category precisely through its deliberate efforts
to establish itself; for the binary matrix to consider it a legitimate reality, though, may well be
impossible, as Kessler and McKenna suggest. The disparate conceptions of a possible reality,
then, cement the incommensurable relationship between nonbinary self and binary other.
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As Butler suggests, narrowing that conceptual gap is not necessarily always the goal of
the nonbinary self. If doing so means a devaluation of its reality, the self may choose to forego
intelligibility. Such a performance makes the nonbinary experience one of perpetual negotiation
and delegitimization. The experiences narrated in Gender Failure illustrate the possibilities of
living as nonbinary in a limiting gender structure. Spoon and Coyote’s interactions with the
world highlight their dislocation from the gender binary but also propose means for authentic
nonbinary existence. A close reading of four aspects of their gender experiences – their
relationships with their bodies, language, their sexualities, and the social world – suggest that
nonbinary individuals perform their selves with a self-consciousness that secures their
personhood within a world that marks their reality as an impossibility.
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Chapter Two
The Razor Edge of Accommodation: Violent Perception and the Nonbinary Body in Gender
Failure
In our binary society, assigning a gender to others is an automatic and, ostensibly,
necessary process: at first glance of a stranger, we use visual clues to categorize the other as
either male or female. Our minds demand this gender categorization in order to perceive
intelligibility in the other: because the binary matrix dictates social interactions, establishing
gender roles and expectations is essential in relating to the other. Accepted gendered appearances
and behaviors create a set of norms that influence our perception of the other and determine
which gender to assign and, subsequently, how that gender assignment will affect interactions.
This violent perceptive act necessarily superimposes the self’s own meanings over the other’s
reality; potential violence plays out most evidently at the point of contact between the nonbinary
self and the binary other. By definition, the nonbinary self lives external to the gender binary,
identifying as neither male nor female, nor anywhere in between. Some nonbinary individuals
claim the transgender label – one that can include any non-normative gender identity, such as
transsexual, cross-dresser, and genderqueer – thereby orienting themselves in opposition to the
norm. The nonbinary performance can take any form, but the binary other rarely perceives it
accurately.
Nonbinary gender identities challenge the gendered truths and norms that govern the
better part of social interactions; situated outside the binary matrix, the nonbinary identity refuses
binary meanings, becoming a figure of unintelligibility for binary others. Thus, though the
nonbinary gender experience varies by the extent to which individuals decide to socially and
physically perform their identity, it has a substantial impact on the nonbinary individual’s
relationship with the binary world around them. When a binary self perceives a nonbinary other,
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binary truths are forcibly applied to make the nonbinary other legible (Butler, Undoing 57).
Illegibility of the nonbinary gender experience occurs on multiple levels, most notably the
physical body, language, and sociality. The struggle for – or resistance to – legibility
characterizes the relationship between the nonbinary self and the binary world.
Due to their position within a binary matrix, the nonbinary self destabilizes the
predominant experienced worldview and as such poses a threat to the security of binary
categories. Binary gender categories define acceptable identities and offer a stable benchmark
protected by norms. Established gender norms regulate the perception of gender, rendering the
gendered body intelligible (Butler, Undoing 42); presumptions regarding the other’s perceived
gender identity necessarily erase reality: if my experienced gender falls outside the binary and
the other judges the perceived gender against a binary standard, my gender will be read as a
(delinquent) binary identity.
In a phenomenological approach to social interactions, processes of performance and
perception create a system wherein self and other arrive at different and often conflicting
conclusions about identity. The observing self perceives the performance of the other and
supplements the imperfect impression with anticipated profiles that stem from the self’s own
modes of truth. The resultant synthesized image of the performing other cannot faithfully
represent the reality of their existence, as the observing self cannot know the truths that define
the other. Such a disparity necessarily occurs in all social interactions but the disparity is
especially pronounced in the perceptive relationship between the nonbinary self and the external
binary world.
An insurmountable gap divides the binary perception from the nonbinary experience. In a
phenomenological framework, knowledge of the self – nonbinary or otherwise – is always
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complete and knowledge of the other is always imperfect: as the self observes, aspects of the
other remain hidden as a result of distinct consciousnesses. The self must literally experience the
consciousness of the other in order to fully perceive the other’s existence (Merleau-Ponty 359).
This gap necessarily forces the self to make presumptions about the nature of the other’s hidden
reality, creating what Edmund Husserl calls a “world,” the quotation marks suggesting an
imposed reality that is somehow less authentic than the actual reality (138). This causes a
distortion between how the self identifies and how the other perceives that identity. The only
constant is the experienced world, which exists subjectively to every individual’s position within
it; thus it lacks conformity in how it affects its subjects. In other words, although the nonbinary
self and binary other experience the same objective world, their subjective identities determine
the meanings they will derive from it: where the other moves in the binary world with relative
ease, the nonbinary self must make space for its identity within a normalizing gender matrix.
In the recent text adaptation of their live show Gender Failure, Ivan Coyote and Rae
Spoon – two individuals assigned female at birth and who now use the singular pronoun “they” –
address the everyday nonbinary experience through personal anecdotes extending from
childhood to the present. These stories flesh out a gender narrative that resists categorization and
familiarization. The nonbinary gender experience tends to alienate the individual owing to a
social system that compulsively seeks to organize and stabilize threats to binary order; Coyote
and Spoon expound on such alienation and thereby highlight the illegibility of the nonbinary
experience for a binary other.
For individuals with incoherent gender presentations, the public restroom works as a site
of contention with the binary world. Here, gender segregation reifies the gender binary and so
gender presentations receive stringent scrutiny. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception
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proves useful in considering nonbinary gender experiences with regards to the question of public
restrooms. Binary perceptions pose a threat to the nonbinary self, who may face persecution
based on their gender presentation; likewise, the binary self may feel threatened by the
uncategorizable (and therefore dangerous) body of the nonbinary other. Bodily morphology
rarely plays a role in public interactions, as it is not on display and therefore the other cannot
perceive it; if morphology affects public life in any way, it is in the choice between gendered
restrooms.
Coyote – who prefers to perform masculinity – uses public restrooms only as a last resort
after having endured countless instances of harassment. Due to their anatomy – or perhaps
because the other option presents a greater threat to their safety – Coyote chooses to use the
women’s restroom when gender-neutral, single-stall facilities are unavailable (205). They know
their gender presentation startles or even frightens women who perceive Coyote through a binary
lens; as only two restroom options exist, so too must Coyote’s nonbinary self adhere to one of
two accepted gender presentations. Coyote understands the fear their appearance elicits: women
who support strictly segregated restrooms express concerns that men will use any leniency as a
front for committing sexual violence (Benvenuto). Coyote’s own experiences, however, suggest
that the nonbinary self cannot expect safety in the women’s restroom either:
[E]very time a nice lady in her new pantsuit for travelling screams or stares at me,
I try to remember that this is maybe her first encounter with someone who doesn’t
appear to be much of a lady in the ladies’ room. [...] She doesn’t know I have
been verbally harassed in women’s washrooms for years. She doesn’t know I
have been hauled out with my pants still undone by security guards and smashed
over the head with a giant handbag once. (206-7)
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Although in general the nonbinary gender experience resists binary categorization, the use of
public restrooms requires compliance. Coyote chooses the restroom based on their anatomical
configuration; however, the binary other cannot perceive this aspect of Coyote’s existence –
perceiving masculine gender attributes – misreads Coyote’s presence as a threat.
In the phenomenological framework, the body acts as one of the great sites of friction
between the nonbinary self and the binary world. For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the body
expresses existence at every moment, just as a word signifies thought (166). The nonbinary
body, in its incoherence, signifies an existence that cannot be read as human by the binary other
(Butler, Undoing 28). The inhuman nonbinary self threatens the safety and stability of the binary
other, demonstrated by Coyote’s experiences in the extreme binary apparatus of the public
restroom. Phenomenology provides a useful system for understanding the ways nonbinary
identities challenge gender intelligibility.
The stage performance of Gender Failure toured internationally in 2012. With minimal
staging, Spoon and Coyote occupy the center of the audience’s attention. This situation enables a
transgression of gender norms at a micro level: the image of their physical bodies reifies the
nonbinary experiences portrayed in their narratives, forcing their audience to reconcile Spoon
and Coyote’s performances with “ready made” binary gendered meanings. The text reproduction
transfers that ability, placing photos of the authors alongside personal essays. In both media,
Spoon and Coyote control the discourse: the audience cannot escape the embodied reality of the
nonbinary narratives they perceive and consequently struggle to overlay their binary truths onto
the nonbinary other (James 2-4). The staging of the live performance as well as the creative
control in publishing the book affords a significant ability to determine the delivery of their
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words; despite the deliberate presentation of their identity, the gap between self and binary other
remains insurmountable (Flegg).
A primary source of the illegibility of nonbinary genders stems from linguistic barriers:
the binary matrix offers little space for the articulation of nonbinary existence without resorting
to the use of binary language. As a result, nonbinary identities necessarily rely on the binary for
articulation: even the term ‘nonbinary’ requires the existence of the binary for its meaning.
Examining nonbinary genders from within a phenomenological framework reveals the
indeterminacy of nonbinary realities that cannot be perceived by those who do not inhabit them:
intelligibility may be attempted, but only on the terms of the binary matrix. Throughout Gender
Failure, Spoon and Coyote strive to elucidate the nonbinary experience; but for an observing
audience operating within the binary structure, perceptions of the performers’ gender will always
derive intelligibility from binary meanings.

I. Bodies and Embodiment
The body one feels oneself to inhabit is not necessarily the one the other perceives.
Mannerisms, body language, dress codes, and any number of cosmetic modifications contribute
to bodily performance; however, the meaning of the synthesized whole depends on the
observer’s position in relation to the binary. In considering the body of the other the “very first of
all cultural objects,” Merleau-Ponty asks how an object in space can render an existence legible
(348-9). The body-as-object occupies a place in the field of perception; this field accrues social
and cultural contexts that inscribe meaning onto the perceived object. However, the whole of the
object can never be perceived in one moment; instead, the perceived whole is the result of the
synthesis of retained and anticipated profiles of the object (Detmer 103). The anticipated profiles
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are those informed by the perceptive field’s social and cultural contexts and the observer’s
relation to them. Consequently, the meaning of these yet-to-be-seen aspects of the perceived
body emerges from the observer’s preexisting meanings, overwriting the reality experienced by
that body. The public body, therefore, is never quite only our own: through the body “gender and
sexuality become exposed to others, implicated in social processes, inscribed by cultural norms,
and apprehended in their social meanings” (Butler, Undoing 20). While the self assumes
autonomy over how the body is presented for recognition, the social meaning of that
performance necessarily depends on external forces.
The nonbinary body resists recognition by the binary other. Perceptions of the nonbinary
body that originate from within the binary matrix strip the nonbinary self of the reality of their
existence. As a cultural object, the body acts as the initial site of contact between the self and the
perceiving other; this contact between the nonbinary body and binary perception creates a
friction that destabilizes the gender binary. Judith Butler suggests that for those who depend on
the boundaries of the gender binary for stability, the uncategorizable nonbinary body prompts a
violent need to restore order (Undoing 34). Coyote experiences violent retaliation in public
restrooms because of their apparently delinquent body. The violence enacted upon Spoon
emerges from external social forces that manifest as self-harm. In both cases, the violence acts as
a regulatory mechanism for maintaining the order set by the gender binary. The friction between
the body of the nonbinary self and the external world begins for both Coyote and Spoon in
childhood. In a set of chapters titled “Girl Failure,” the authors describe the ways their bodies
resist binary expectations before their nonbinary gender identities are realized.
Coyote’s sense of ‘girl failure’ originates in the demise of a childhood friendship. In
Janine, Coyote finds a friend who also loves sports and despises Barbies: a comrade in the

43

struggle against the traditional narrative of girlhood (22). Around the cataclysmic start of junior
high, however, Coyote begins to feel distanced from Janine, who shows a budding interest in
home ec and cheerleading. In retrospect, what Coyote sees as the culprit in this estrangement was
the interposition of womanhood, which includes Janine’s devotion to cheerleading, her interest in
boys, and her growing breasts (23). The moment that drives the decisive wedge between the two
friends, Coyote says, is the slumber party. Rather than their traditional celebration of Janine’s
birthday – movies and a bucket of fried chicken shared between the two of them – Janine throws
a slumber party and invites her newer, more feminine friends in addition to Coyote. The party is
unsurprisingly miserable, but it only gets worse after Coyote and the girls settle in to sleep:
curled in the dark on their thin bedroll, Coyote overhears Janine telling her friends about
Coyote’s genital configuration; although not technically intersexed, Coyote’s body is
indeterminate enough that these preteen girls knew to categorize it as physically abnormal. They
giggle and shriek words like ‘sick’ while Coyote feigns sleep (24). Rather than attempting to
force binary legibility onto Coyote’s body, the girls instead create a third category in which
Coyote is intelligible only as a deviation from the binary ideal, demonstrating the utility of the
normal/abnormal (human/inhuman) binary in policing conformity to the gender binary.
Coyote marks this moment as the beginning of their fear of changing in front of others in
public locker rooms: they use toilet stalls and they have “a scar on [their] elbow where [they]
split it open on the rough edge of a toilet paper dispenser to prove it” (24). As a result of this first
vocalized fear of their physical ambiguity, Coyote learned to accommodate the concerns of
binary others in public spaces and experiences their own fear of physical and psychic pain in the
process. Binary others perceive the world from within the binary matrix; Coyote’s body – both
the indeterminate sexual surface and the illegible gendered body – does not adhere to a
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sanctioned binary performance, triggering the urge to restore order. In some situations, such as
public restrooms and locker rooms, Coyote has to take conscious steps to protect themself from
the violence intended to maintain the gender binary. According to Butler, “the person who
threatens violence proceeds from the anxious and rigid belief that a sense of world and a sense of
self will be radically undermined if [the nonbinary body], uncategorizable, is permitted to live
within the social world” (Undoing 34). The binary other’s anxiety stems from the possibility that
the strict gender categories on which they depend for social meanings are unstable and, worse,
unnatural. Violence toward nonbinary bodies and performances is meant to delineate what can be
considered human. Consequently, innocuous tasks in the public world become threats to the
nonbinary physical and psychic self.
For Spoon, ‘girl failure’ corresponds with a deep bodily shame. Raised in a Pentecostal
household in Calgary, Alberta, Spoon comes of age steeped in conservative notions of
appropriate gender roles and behavior. Despite having been socialized as a girl in such an
atmosphere, Spoon says, “being a girl is something that never really happened for [them]” (27).
This phraseology suggests that ‘being a girl’ is not an innate quality of the female body but
rather something that has been imposed upon it, the social construction of the gender-neutral
infant into a gendered being. Spoon feels they never went through this gendering process and
instead remains – at their core – gender-neutral.
In an attempt to avoid verbal and physical retribution – and thus psychic discomfort –
Spoon adopts a performance of binary femininity expected by their parents and peers. The
disruption of this disguise occurs in a sex-segregated junior high gym class. One of the first
activity units for the girls is dance aerobics; outside, the boys play rugby, which “look[s]
violent,” but not as dangerous as what Spoon expects to experience on the dance floor (28).
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Although their identity manifests as an uncomfortable and delinquent girlhood, the young Spoon
already experiences the danger of the binary regulatory apparatus. Having been taught that
dancing is sinful, Spoon finds that their body struggles with the movements that come so easily
to the other girls. Spoon wonders whether their body also resists the overt feminine performance
prescribed by an external social force (ibid.). The gym teacher, a compliant subject of the binary
matrix, expects all of the girls in her class to step easily into the binary femininity that is their
birthright. Because the binary other perceives Spoon’s body as female, Spoon feels a compulsion
to conform; they participate in dance class until “some distant part of [their] psyche” impels
them to literally bolt in fear from the gymnasium, escaping the binary expectations the instructor
and their peers impose upon them.
This coercive binary conformity instigates a violent relationship between Spoon’s
internal nonbinary self and their external perceived body. In the locker room of that same gym
class, Spoon overhears their classmates talking about shaving their legs; ashamed of not having
performed this binary behavior, Spoon ducks into a toilet stall to change (27) – like Coyote,
Spoon finds refuge in the only individual space in the public locker room. This ‘girl failure’
torments Spoon throughout the day. That night in the bathtub, they use their mother’s pink razor
to shave their legs; unskilled in this particular feminine act, Spoon cuts their legs (28). This first
attempt to conform to binary gender expectations literally wounds the self, both at the level of
the skin as well as on a psychic level; the blood dripping from Spoon’s legs embodies the razoredged divide between acceptable and delinquent gender performances. Puberty magnifies
Spoon’s violent relationship with their body: it forces that relationship to become a battle of the
internal self against the external self.
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Judith Halberstam characterizes puberty as the “persistence of the flesh,” a purely
biological process that overrides the gendered identity (“Transgender” 465). As this persistence
forces Spoon’s physical body to become categorically female, they believe that their internal self
will “stay they same: ambivalent to the confusing expectations that surround [them]” (116). This
split between internal and external selves suggests another psychic wounding that is deeply
rooted in the negotiation of a nonbinary identity within a binary matrix; as (an unquestionably
and visibly female) puberty progresses, Spoon loses control over their part in that negotiation
and the split widens. Spoon’s body changes, taking on the anticipated female shape of their sex
and as a result Spoon can no longer manipulate how others read their body. In a final bid to gain
control over their physical body, Spoon decides to stop eating, to prevent the body they hate
from becoming more abhorrent (ibid.).
Again the body suffers the psychic pain of occupying a gender non-space and almost
disappears completely; Spoon recognizes that their body signifies a gender that they do not
claim, and acts as a barrier to accurate perceptions by binary others. The binary other perceives
Spoon’s nonbinary body from within the binary matrix and thus attempts to compel the
perceived gender to fit into a binary category. Spoon’s acknowledgement of this process allows
them to dismantle the enforced social construction of gender based on the body, thereby
separating their gender identity from the appearance of their physical body. Only once this
acknowledgement has been made can Spoon heal the division between internal and external
selves.
Not all nonbinary individuals feel the need to medically alter their body in order to
provide the binary other with an accurate reading of the nonbinary body. For Coyote, the surgical
reconstruction of their chest – i.e. a double mastectomy – is necessary for bodily as well as

47

psychic comfort. In the medical process of physical alteration there is no traditional narrative for
nonbinary bodies: bureaucratic gatekeepers familiar with transsexual surgical alterations (those
that alter primary and secondary sex characteristics to align with an individual’s binary gender
identity and are performed in conjunction with hormone therapy) find it difficult to approve a
body for surgery when the patient does not intend to emerge on the opposite side of the binary.
Coyote finds that, in order to be approved for insurance coverage, they have to perform a
familiar binary transsexual narrative.
Coyote does not want to transition from female to male, but there is no narrative available
for individuals who identify as Coyote does; of the many forms they had to fill out, Coyote says,
“there is no box for not wanting a box at all. No one knows how to fix that” (70). For the
bureaucratic gatekeepers, chest reconstruction surgery is ultimately about ‘fixing’ the patient so
that they can accurately perform a binary gender, which, as far as the regulatory matrix is
concerned, begins in the body. In fact, the pivotal question in Coyote’s initial interview with a
therapist is whether or not Coyote wears a prosthetic penis (ibid.). Where their disinterest in
taking hormones was sure to disqualify Coyote for insurance coverage, their affirmative answer
to this question receives the therapist’s approval; the success depends wholly on Coyote’s
adherence to binary norms, signified here by their desire for that immutable sign of maleness.
Whether or not Coyote actually packs is irrelevant: what matters is that they must appear to live
a binary narrative – written by binary, normatively gendered people – in order to achieve a
livable body.

II. Speaking a Language That Can Be Heard
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After positioning the physical body in the social world, the next strategy for articulating
an existence is the use of language. For the nonbinary self, the articulation of existence
inevitably comes up against the barrier of available language; no language for describing the
nonbinary gender experience exists: articulation must be attempted via binary language. Gayle
Salamon identifies self-definition as a linguistic act, thereby underscoring the power of language;
at the same time, she acknowledges the difficulty in using language to articulate nonnormative
genders: “gender...must be separated from language in order to be seen clearly, and the labor of
elucidating that which escapes language through the use of language itself is a formidable and
frustrating task indeed” (82). The nonbinary gender experience already seems unintelligible to
the binary other; the use of the established language – in both pronouns as well as the adjectival
agreement in romance languages – undermines the project of articulation by situating the
nonbinary experience within the confines of binary understanding: the nonbinary self only
approaches intelligibility through a reliance on the hegemonic gender system, a means that
necessarily strips away the crucial independence from the binary.
The attempt to articulate the nonbinary experience resists Merleau-Ponty’s understanding
of the social phenomenon of communication. He sees the system of communication as the self’s
appropriation of the other’s thought as expressed through speech; this process not only enriches
the self’s own thoughts, but also allows for the ability to think the way the perceived other thinks
(179). Due to the linguistic and experiential barriers between the nonbinary and the binary, a true
taking up of the other’s thoughts can never be achieved. For the binary other to be able to think
according to the nonbinary self, a common language must be established, but, as Merleau-Ponty
himself points out: “people can speak to us only a language which we already understand” (178);
meaning can be ascribed to a signifying word only if we already possess the meaning. The
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nonbinary gender identity must be psychically and bodily experienced in order for the meaning
to be known. Self-articulation can attempt to define the nonbinary gender experience, but until a
specifically nonbinary language exists, binary others will only ever understand the self on their
own terms.
When language fails to achieve its goal, binary others cannot perceive the reality of the
nonbinary existence; precise language allows the self to take up the other’s thoughts, and without
it the distance between perception and reality cannot be bridged. Coyote describes this distance
between them and the surgeon’s staff prior to their chest reconstruction surgery: although the
staff has experience working with transgender patients and conducts their task professionally and
amiably, Coyote “never quite feels like [the staff] truly [understands them]” (96). Even when the
binary other can take in the general sense of the narrative told by the nonbinary self, a grasp of
the reality of the nonbinary existence can never be fully reached: the staff do not already possess
the meaning of the nonbinary existence. In other words, having not lived in opposition to the
hegemonic social structure, the surgical staff cannot empathize with Coyote’s gender experience.
Their resultant perception overlays Coyote’s reality, creating Husserl’s phenomenological
“world” and discounting the authenticity of Coyote’s identity.
Nonbinary gendered individuals know that the language does not exist to accurately
define their existence. Merleau-Ponty explains that, when direct perception fails to create an
accurate understanding of the other, the self must rely on observed correlations between the
experience of the self and the other (352); again, this precludes the authenticity of the reality, as
the binary other lacks the experience to perceive actual correlations with the nonbinary self: thus
the nonbinary existence is silenced or erased in the act of being perceived. The internal hurts this
causes in the nonbinary self reifies the lack of space afforded them in the binary world. Coyote
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acknowledges that the nature of communication between the nonbinary self and the binary other
makes recognition impossible, and yet:
[The] truth is that every time I am misgendered, a tiny little sliver of me
disappears. A tiny little sliver of me is reminded that I do not fit, I am not this, I
am not that, I am not seen, I can’t be recognized, I have no name. I remember that
the truth of me is invisible, and a tiny little sliver of me disappears. Just a sliver,
razored from the surface of my very thick skin most days, but other times right
from my soul, sometimes felt so deep and other days simply shrugged off, but
still. All those slivers add up to something much harder to pretend around. (246)
Like Spoon, Coyote feels the razor-sharp edge of gender conformity. Their gender performance
and identity do not line up with binary expectations, and so the reality of the nonbinary self is
pared away until only a skeleton of their existence remains. Without the language to correct
binary perceptions, Coyote and other nonbinary individuals must resign themselves to a narrative
that can be interpreted by binary observers but that does not accurately reflect their identity or
experience.
The binary narratives that nonbinary individuals tell must have some measure of
familiarity for the binary other; this typically means such narratives fall within the category of
transgender. Although many nonbinary people consider their identity to be a form of
transgenderism, the transgender narrative still tends to exist within the binary structure: the
dominant conception of a transperson is one that identifies with the gender at the opposite end of
the spectrum and takes steps to embody that binary gender identity. Coming from a background
of strict binary gender expectations, Spoon initially takes up the female-to-male transgender
narrative. It “seem[s] to fit” for Spoon, who had never known that gender could be an option
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rather than a concrete fact. The move within the gender binary reaches Spoon’s deeper feelings
of discontent with how their body represents their self; however, their body still poses a barrier
for an authentic representation, but Spoon decides that this is due to their decision not to pursue
hormones (as a musician by trade, Spoon cannot afford the vocal changes that testosterone would
cause) (117).
As this binary transgender identity comes into conflict within the binary system, the fit
becomes less accurate: Spoon realizes that even binary transgender people cannot meet the ideal
social expectations of transmasculinity – the characteristics of the transman who consciously
constructs sanctioned binary masculinity – and so stops attempting to present a body that fits
either end of the binary spectrum, at last claiming a nonbinary identity (241). Spoon’s efforts to
live a legible binary existence by way of a transgender narrative demonstrate the futility of such
a feat: conceptions of transgender narratives as binary phenomena erase the reality of the
nonbinary gender identity. Taking up this narrative as a person raised within the binary matrix
and therefore performing a binary identity, Spoon experiences gender misperceptions and
identity erasure; Spoon thus learns that the binary offers no space for their gender identity. The
binary language they use to define their identity for themself creates the same distance between
the lived and interior selves that exists between the nonbinary self and the binary other. This
conceptual gap invalidates the nonbinary experience as the binary other situates it within a binary
context.
In transitioning to a nonbinary gender performance, Spoon comes up against the question
of pronouns. As the primary tool for delineating between gendered beings, pronouns pose a
significant challenge in navigating the social world as a nonbinary person. Though many options
for gender-neutral pronouns are unfamiliar (ze/zir/zirs, for example), but many nonbinary
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individuals – perhaps in an attempt to remain somewhat legible to binary others – use the
singular ‘they’ (“Need”). When Spoon initially learns that people use this pronoun, they think “it
would be pretty hard to get people to actually call you that outside the queer community” (200).
This concern gets at the issue of legitimacy often tied up in the use of language to articulate a
nonbinary gender identity: Western language depends on a binary system for intelligibility, and
so the binary world perceives any language that makes room for nonbinary articulation
illegitimate. Endeavoring to use ‘they’ for others feels like learning a foreign language for
Spoon; still living according to the binary matrix, Spoon themself struggles to accept this third
gender pronoun as legitimate. As their gender identity shifts to nonbinary, however, “they”
becomes to feel more accurate: the gender-neutral pronoun gives Spoon space to perform their
gender without allowing the perceiving other to rely on language to read Spoon’s gender (201).
Coyote, too, uses “they” because it feels more right than either binary pronoun. That
feeling of “rightness” plays a large part in living a livable nonbinary life for Coyote (221).
Coyote and Spoon both strive to be recognized as their authentic selves; however, the terms that
determine recognition originate in socially constituted binary gender norms. This imposition of
conflicting terms, Butler claims, could make the subject’s life unlivable. Unlivability is not the
terminus of imposed binary language: rather, Butler sees it as an opportunity for “establishing
more inclusive conditions” for determining recognition (Undoing 4). The possibility for more
inclusive conditions can be found in the acceptance of gender-neutral pronouns as legitimate.
Pronouns, Coyote believes, should be used based on what makes a person comfortable.
Unfortunately, this line of reasoning does not make sense for most binary-minded individuals,
who understand that, even though the binary spectrum includes varying degrees of femininity
and masculinity, “she” and “he” cover all possible gender identities.
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A linguistic common ground must be established so that the nonbinary existence can be
accurately communicated to the binary other, thereby creating space in the lexicon for nonbinary
voices. Currently, Coyote finds that they have to use language in such a way that ensures comfort
for the binary other rather than expressing Coyote’s existence: by, for example, assuring the
women in the public restroom that Coyote was also assigned female at birth (208). The common
ground, then, is uneven. Because of their daily experience on such uneven ground, Coyote
believes that a truly accurate language – binary or otherwise – cannot exist: “These are just
words, and words are always imperfect, words are just sounds we make with our mouths that
point our minds to think of things that cannot be fully described in words anyway” (247).
Acknowledging the truth of this characterization of language – particularly the language meant
to define the individual self – could establish a compromise – if not a common ground – where
language is accepted as subjective. Such a compromise, while imperfect, would delay if not deny
the imposition of the other’s meanings.

III. Sexuality and the Gendered Self
The experience and performance of sexuality transforms the body into a means of
relating to the external world. Merleau-Ponty considers sexuality the exemplar of transcendence
because – via the animation of the body through desire – it establishes an experiential
relationship between the self and the world (Salamon 56). Sexual relationships in the binary
world force the nonbinary self to negotiate the conflict between the gendered self and the sexed
body; the performance of the body does not necessarily result in an accurate portrayal of the self.
Thus, a nonbinary individual whose gender identity is illegible at the bodily surface may have to
work to earn a socially granted gender so as to receive the attention of the desired object; for
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example, Spoon appears, at the surface, feminine, which becomes an obstacle when they try to
date men. Often, Spoon’s appearance and voice prompts immediate dismissal by gay men and
even friends: “You probably don’t have what I like in a man,” or “Honey, I don’t think he dates
men like you” (175-6). This tendency to erase the non-normative gender identity and the selfdefined sexual orientation to only consider the sexed body demonstrates the serious inability of
the binary other to take in all parts of the nonbinary existence in order to create a unified whole.
In response to these immediate dismissals, Spoon turns to Grindr, a dating app they hope
will provide “a window into the world of gay male cruising” (176). What Spoon gets instead are
cold rejections based entirely on the language they use to describe themself – i.e complete
candidness about their transgender identity – rather than on their appearance and voice.
(Although Spoon does include a photo of themself, because of the context in which it is viewed,
others initially perceive Spoon as a younger effeminate man.) While Spoon has complete control
in how they present their self, they still experience dismissal as a valid candidate for gay male
sexual partner. Spoon learns that the rules that govern physical bodies in the gay community
leaves little space for nonbinary bodies: all of the replies to their profile Spoon receives demand
to know whether Spoon has had their genitals surgically altered (ibid.)
Just as in every other aspect of their life, Spoon must work against the norms that
determine what gendered bodies are allowable in order to find a partner. Butler underscores the
protective power of social norms against the threat of the uncategorizable other (Undoing 28):
the gay community upholds strict norms for gender and sexual performances, which for many
gay men means the presence of a penis; in other words, Spoon’s “female” anatomy represents for
these men the possibility of being marked as heterosexual. This particular physical absence
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causes Spoon to be read as ‘other,’ a threat that many of the men they find on Grindr are not
willing to take on.
Eventually, Spoon turns back to their own queer community, meeting partners through
friends. When they still identified as transgender, Spoon had to consciously maintain their
gender narrative: new binary partners were subject to a vetting period to determine whether they
really believed Spoon’s gender narrative. Spoon drew from existing heterosexual and
homosexual narratives to establish the story of their relationships: for example, when dating
women Spoon sought out women who identified as women and who accepted Spoon as a man,
justifying their relationship as heterosexual (240). When they begin to identify as nonbinary,
Spoon’s approach to relationships shifts. According to Butler, sexual orientation results from a
very specific life history and narrative (Undoing 80); the fluidity of Spoon’s gender history has
necessarily created a flexible understanding of sexuality and the narratives they tell reflect that.
When they date, they have to find partners who understand Spoon as nonbinary (even if they
cannot fully comprehend ‘nonbinary’), and they still need to agree on a narrative – one where the
relationship is not gendered at all (242). The narratives are important: they provide guidelines for
Spoon and their partner for how society will expect the couple to interact with each other and the
world.
Coyote’s sexual narrative lacks the fluidity of Spoon’s: their binary gendered partner has
remained a constant throughout Coyote’s gender journey. The two do not rely on a narrative
(binary or otherwise) to understand their relationship. Consequently, they have achieved a level
of intimacy where the binary other comes close to perceiving the reality of the nonbinary self.
Coyote’s partner knows how Coyote experiences their nonbinary existence to the best of her
ability. However, she cannot perceive Coyote’s existence fully unless she physically and
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psychically experiences Coyote’s nonbinary gender: despite their intimacy, there will always be
that disparity of perception. Their intimacy, though, allows Coyote to relate to the external world
– in the form of their partner – with nearly complete authenticity. Laurie Spurling suggests that
“[there] are times of almost total integration between consciousness and body, in those moments
when we are truly ‘at home’ in our bodies (such as, perhaps, sexual intercourse) and experience
our body, not as a screen between us and the world, but as our opening onto the world” (24).
Coyote’s desire for their partner and the intimacy they share situates Coyote in the world as a
sexual being whose gender identity, for the moment, is not relevant in the experience of the
body. At the same time, their partner does not need to define Coyote’s gender in order to
perceive them as a sexual being; Coyote can, as Spurling suggests, experience the world as a
physically and psychically unified whole.

IV. The Nonbinary Self as Social Object
The meaning of an individual’s existence depends entirely on their interactions with the
social world. The binary matrix is a permanent field of existence, and though the self may turn
away from it, the meaning of their gendered existence will always be situated in relation to it
(Merleau-Ponty 361); the pervasiveness of the binary matrix makes total escape from its
constraints impossible. The nonbinary self, then, must negotiate the binary structure of the social
world in order to maintain their existence. Friction between the nonbinary self and the external
world – caused by binary others, gender norms, and physical spaces – threatens the stability of
the nonbinary identity. As a result of their negative experiences with public restrooms, Coyote
feels that the conflict arises from the exclusion of nonbinary people from public spaces: “we live
in a world that is unable to make room enough for trans people to pee in safety” (205). The
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physical and social structures of the binary world are not accessible for nonbinary individuals,
causing people – including Coyote – to seek out wheelchair-accessible, gender-neutral
restrooms; consequently, the nonbinary gender identity becomes a literal impairment for
navigating the external world. Coyote, though, does not see women in public restrooms as
adversaries, but rather “the potential for many built-in comrades in the fight for gender-neutral,
single-stall locking washrooms in all public places” (208). Sex-segregated restrooms allow
gender-normative women to police unintelligible nonbinary bodies; gender-neutral restrooms
would not only protect the safety of both groups but also make room for nonbinary people within
the physical and social binary architectures.
An individual claims space within the binary social structure in their use of identity
labels. The identity labels that nonbinary individuals use can sometimes overlap and conflict
with binary notions of identity. Coyote, for example, still identifies as butch; in their usage,
however, “butch” does not qualify the noun “woman” (233). Although butch is a binary term
used primarily in the lesbian community to signify masculinity, Coyote has claimed it as a
gender category for their nonbinary identity; for them, ‘butch’ occupies the non-space outside the
gender binary, although others do not always read it as such. In all perceptive acts, the binary
other will resist nonbinary readings and will instead project the binary system onto the nonbinary
self. Coyote finds that, even in the queer community, others ascribe differing binary gender
labels to them in an effort to ‘claim’ Coyote as a spokesperson. After a solo show in Seattle, a
woman approaches Coyote and thanks them for speaking up for butch women; Coyote smiles,
but does not feel that had been the crux of their show. Shortly after the woman leaves, a young
man steps up to Coyote to thank them for representing transgender men; again, Coyote just
smiles, knowing that correcting the man will serve no purpose (233-4). Both communities, in
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claiming Coyote as their own, perform the binary violence of erasing Coyote’s actual identity.
Coyote understands that the misinterpretation stems from “limited language and the scarcity of
shared meanings of words” (235); as with binary others, the nonbinary self can achieve a
linguistic common ground with a queer other only if the other has literally experienced the
nonbinary existence. These grateful individuals, though queer, are both subjects of the binary
matrix, forming binary interpretations of Coyote’s nonbinary narrative.
According to Michel Foucault, all social interactions involve the expectation of
surveillance. The nonbinary self, consequently, monitors its behavior to avoid the retribution of
binary judges (Crawley et al 89). Like Coyote, Spoon performs on public stages and faces the
scrutiny and judgment of binary audiences. As a musician, Spoon has to negotiate their presence
as an object onstage with their gender presentation. When they begin to take their music on tour,
Spoon is strictly a country singer, a predominantly heteronormative genre. They soon find that
the patrons in the venues that book small-time country singers cannot conceive of anything
outside the binary; Spoon has to censor themself in their music to avoid physically violent
retribution for straying from accepted binary behavior (136).
By situating their gendered body on a stage, Spoon offers it up to the other’s gaze.
Merleau-Ponty considers the gaze that runs over the self’s body constitutive of a dialectic of the
self and other in which the gaze of the other has the ability to steal the body from the self (167).
When Spoon performs their music in homophobic and transphobic venues, the patrons’ gaze
steals Spoon’s body as well as the gender identity Spoon inscribes at its surface. To preserve the
meaning of their gender performance, Spoon begins to selectively choose venues where patrons
allow Spoon to break gender rules; such patrons also seem more accepting of Spoon breaking
musical genre rules (164). Spoon’s musical career can serve as a microcosm of their nonbinary
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gender experience: the hazards Spoon’s objective body encounters in the binary social world
constructs the performance of their gendered body; binary observers who find some intelligibility
in Spoon’s performance allow Spoon to bend norms (even slightly) to suit their identity.
Spoon’s performing career makes them hyperaware of the violence of the other’s
perceptive gaze. They understand that in social interactions binary individuals compulsively
assign a gender to one another and act out the appropriate script (217). The meaning of gender
and gender performances depends on how others external to the self perceive and interpret a
gendered existence, despite the self’s autonomous quest for recognition; Butler calls this the
“lively paradox” of gender presentation (Undoing 21). Once a coherent meaning is acquired, the
binary other imposes it on the nonbinary self, erasing the actual nonbinary existence. The reality
of this erasure disrupts Spoon’s performance of their authentic nonbinary self: because the
instinct is to assign binary gender narratives to the nonbinary self for intelligibility, Spoon must
know how others read their gender in order to know how to behave so they might be recognized
as human.
Most of Spoon’s public interactions “involve the immediate assignment as a woman, or
the slow reveal of people discovering they would rather assign [Spoon] to the category of
female” (251). The binary social world seeks to organize and regulate its subjects through social
norms: while Spoon’s performed self may appear ambiguous, the combination of their
appearance and voice (both unaltered by medical intervention) signals to the binary other that
Spoon is a woman. Spoon and Coyote – whose identity queer binary others overwrite –
experience the perceptive act as one that erases their gender identities. Because the available
modes of self-articulation – bodily and verbal – become meaningful only in the other’s
perception, the nonbinary self must accept a compromise in their gender performance: Coyote,
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for example, allows themself to be viewed as both a butch lesbian and a transgender male
because they know those individuals need the validation Coyote provides in their work; they use
the feminine pronoun when doing work in public schools because they “want those women and
girls to see every kind of she there can be” (222). Coyote’s nonbinary self loses its visibility in
these interactions; however, the strategic production of binary intelligibility allows them to
encourage gender difference and ambiguity in others, opening up the breadth of accepted
gendered realities just a little.

Before any social interaction begins, Spoon wants to ask the other, “what do you think I
am” (217)? The binary other’s perception of Spoon’s gender presentation determines the
performance expected of Spoon for their gender identity to be considered intelligible. In the
construction of that intelligibility, the destructive power of the binary other’s gaze erases the
reality of the nonbinary existence in the very moment the nonbinary self is being perceived.
Nonbinary individuals like Spoon and Coyote threaten the binary worldview, denaturalize gender
categories, and insert themselves into the social world as gendered beings; Spoon and Coyote’s
experiences in public spaces and interactions with binary others demonstrate the instability of the
binary gender system. The wounding of Spoon’s physical body and the abuse Coyote
experiences in public restrooms suggest that the fierce policing of binary boundaries reifies the
constraints of accepted gender norms: the apparently delinquent body of the nonbinary self faces
violent retribution for refusing binary gender categories.
The phenomenological investigation of nonbinary genders suggests that individuals who
do not experience the nonbinary reality cannot fully comprehend that reality. Coyote’s

61

interactions with their surgeon’s staff illustrates this impossibility: although everyone in the
surgeon’s office has experience working with transgender individuals who need to surgically
alter their body to make it livable, Coyote can feel that they are not wholly understood by the
binary staff (96). Cognitively, the staff understands the logic that drives Coyote to pursue chest
reconstruction surgery, but without having experienced the psychic and physical nonbinary
reality, the staff cannot reach complete empathy.
Binary perception of the nonbinary self only ever exists on the terms of the binary matrix:
intelligibility of the nonbinary existence originates in binary meanings, necessarily erasing the
meanings that determine that nonbinary existence. At the same time, the nonbinary self must rely
on the binary framework to inform their gender experience. For example, Spoon and Coyote both
situate themselves linguistically in relation to binary constructs: each claims the pronoun ‘they’ –
the existing binary third-person pronoun – as a nonbinary designation. In doing so, Spoon and
Coyote resist gender conformity by confounding binary meanings and appropriating space in the
binary construct for nonbinary articulation.
If the body is the first cultural object, Merleau-Ponty wonders how that object can
produce a legible existence (348). Positioned in a perceptual field grounded in binary contexts,
the nonbinary body rejects all of the meanings that make an existence legible to the binary other.
Spoon and Coyote frequently manipulate binary constructs to understand their own gender
identities – e.g. in their use of pronouns or in constructing narratives of sexuality – but still resist
binary legibility. As the site of initial contact between nonbinary self and binary world, the body
visually articulates the nonbinary experience; however, any perception formed by the binary
other will necessarily overwrite the nonbinary reality with binary meanings. Nonbinary
narratives, though constructed from elements and repurposed meanings of the binary gender
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construct, oppose the binary worldview; a “limited language and scarcity of shared meanings”
makes true empathy with the nonbinary existence impossible for the binary other.
Gender Failure showcases the real life experiences of two nonbinary gendered
individuals. Both the original show and the text are intended for an audience of unlimited gender
and sexual identities: although only nonbinary audience members will experience the narratives a
profound empathy, everyone has the ability to make space for the nonbinary reality in their
understanding of gender. Public speakers like Spoon and Coyote put themselves at the mercy of
the violence of the perceptive act; although their authentic selves may disappear in the face of
binary perception, the candidness of their gendered realities make space for their existence,
starting with those who choose to hear their stories.

.
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Conclusion
Making Space
In May 2011, Kathy Witterick published an article in the Ottawa Citizen stating that she
and her husband planned raise their new baby gender-neutrally. This would mean keeping the
baby’s sex private from all but a select few and letting them vocalize their own gender identity
once that identity took shape. The family received over a hundred interview requests and were
the subject of global debate about raising a child without gender; public response ranged from
vocal support to accusations of child abuse. Their plan was not to force the child to identify as
nonbinary but rather, by not imposing the gender binary, they could gift their child autonomy in
defining its gender identity without the influence of social norms (Witterick).
The Wittericks faced opposition in the wake of this article precisely because the reality of
nonbinary was made so visible. Ostensibly, the worry was that the child would be the victim of
bullying simply because they used different pronouns or did not present a binary gender
performance; in fact, the people who cried abuse embodied the fear of the nonbinary: their
concern was not for the child as an individual, but as a subject whose mere upbringing would
challenge the notion of a stable binary truth. The possibility that parents could give their children
freedom from the regulatory binary system proved that the binary is not inherent: stripped of its
“natural” status, the binary loses its normative power.
Can a child be raised completely gender-neutrally? In a matrix where everything is
defined by its relation to a binary, it seems unlikely that parents could totally avoid the influence
of gender norms. Certainly the Wittericks’ alternative lifestyle makes their decision feasible: all
three of their children are homeschooled, and the family lives off the grid in a remote area in
Ontario (Poisson). Removed as they are from society, the child can grow up without oppressive
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gender expectations; but not everyone has this luxury. In fact, Halberstam believes that trying to
avoid gendering a child is a futile task. Instead he calls for encouraging alternative forms of
femininity or masculinity that go against social expectations – for example, encouraging forms of
female culture that do not require dolls and makeup, or discouraging the masculine activity of
bullying (Danbolt).
Halberstam’s work in transgender theory primarily explores the alternatives: alternative
genders, alternative sexualities, and alternative ways of being. His response to gender-neutral
parenting suggests that authentically living without gender is perhaps too alternative within the
binary matrix. Spoon’s and Coyote’s experiences do demonstrate the difficulty of presenting an
intelligible nonbinary gender identity – but does this mean that there is no space for an authentic
nonbinary existence in the binary matrix?
Nonbinary individuals like Spoon and Coyote make small efforts every day to claim
space for themselves: both have chosen gender-neutral pronouns; Spoon establishes gender
narratives with romantic partners to maintain their nonbinary identity; Coyote resists tradition
medical transition as the binary matrix defines it. While these small acts do not demand a gender
revolution, they do make it possible for Spoon and Coyote to live according to their authentic
self. Their work as public speakers and entertainers presents the reality of the nonbinary
experience; in doing so, nonbinary audience members feel their identity validated, while their
binary peers are made aware of the broad spectrum of human experience.
Complete empathetic understanding is impossible between any individual, binary or not:
a life would have to be identically experienced in order for two people to totally share meanings.
The nature of the nonbinary gender experience – one that goes so completely against the binary
hegemony – means there is an unbridgeable gap in empathy between the nonbinary self and
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binary other. However, this does not mean that nonbinary is illegitimate and untenable in a
binary context; indeed, the existence of Gender Failure demonstrates that nonbinary as a
category can be presented in such a way that it becomes accessible for even a binary audience. If
complete empathy is unattainable, the public lives of Spoon, Coyote, and the Wittericks
demonstrate that such unequivocal empathy is not necessary for a valid nonbinary experience.

66

Bibliography
Ahmed, Sara. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. Durham: Duke UP, 2006.
Print.
Bevenuto, Christine. “The Bathroom Question.” Sex Changes. Mar. 5 2013. Web.
Bornstein, Kate. Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women, and the Rest of Us. New York: Routledge,
1994. Print.
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge, 2008. Print.
-----. Undoing Gender. New York: Routledge, 2004. Print.
Brook, Andrew. "Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self." The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. 2013. Web. February 17, 2016
Cordes, Drew. “Am I a Queer Transgender or a Trans Genderqueer?” The Bilerco Project. Nov
28 2012. Web.
Crawley, Sara L., Lara J. Foley, and Constance L. Shehan. Gendering Bodies. Lanham: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2008. Print.
Danbolt, Mathias. “The Eccentric Archive: An Interview With Judith Halberstam.” Trikster.
Web.
Davidmann, Sara. "Beyond Borders: Lived Experiences of Atypically Gendered Transsexual
People." Transgender Identities: Towards a Social Analysis of Gender Diversity. Ed.
Sally Hines and Tam Sanger. New York: Routledge, 2010. 64-86. Print.
Detmer, David. Phenomenology Explained: From Experience to Insight. Chicago: Open Court,
2013. Print.
Flegg, Erin. "Beyond the Gender Binary." Xtra West April 10 2014: 18. Web.

67

Freud, Sigmund. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Trans. James Strachey. New York:
Basic Books, 1962.
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self In Everyday Life. New York: Anchor, 1959. Print.
Halberstam, Judith. Female Masculinity. Durham: Duker UP, 1998. Print.
Husserl, Edmund. The Idea of Phenomenology. Trans. William P. Alston and George
Nakhnikian. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1973. Print.
-----. "Ideas." Literary Theory: An Anthology. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Second ed.
Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004. 137-41. Print.
Kessler, Suzanne, and Wendy McKenna. "Who Put the "Trans" in Transgender?: Gender Theory
and Everyday Life." The International Journal of Transgenderism. 4.3. 2000. Web.
Jakubowski, Kaylee. "No, The Existence of Trans People Doesn’t Validate Gender
Essentialism." Everyday Feminism. March 9 2015. Web. February 29, 2016
James, Suzanne. "'[S]traddling the Gender Fence': Trans-Border Crossings in Rae Spoon and
Ivan E. Coyote's Gender Failure.” 2014. TS. University of British Columbia.
Marshall, George J. A Guide to Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Milwaukee, WI:
Marquette UP, 2008. Print.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith. New York:
Humanities, 1962. Print.
"The Need for a Gender-Neutral Pronoun." Gender Neutral Pronoun Blog. N.p., 24 Jan. 2010.
Web. 25 Nov. 2015.
Poisson, Jayme. “Remember Storm? We check in on the baby being raised gender-neutral.” The
Star. Nov 15 2013. Web.
Salamon, Gayle. Assuming a Body: Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality. New York:
Columbia UP, 2010. Print.

68

Smith, David Woodruff. "Phenomenology." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed.
Edward N. Zalta. 2013. Web. February 29, 2016
Spoon, Rae and Ivan E. Coyote. Gender Failure. Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2014. Print.
Spurling, Laurie. Phenomenology and the Social World: The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and
Its Relation to the Social Sciences. London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1977. Print
Whittle, Stephen. "Gender Fucking Or Fucking Gender?: Current Cultural Contributions to
Theories of Gender Blending."Blending Genders : Social Aspects of Cross-Dressing and
Sex-Changing. Ed. Richard Ekins and Dave King. London: Routledge, 2002. 196-214.
Print.
Witterick, Kathy. "Baby Storm’s mother speaks on gender, parenting and media." Ottawa
Citizen. May 27 2011.Web. October 1, 2015

69

